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TOW ARD SUPREMACY OF TREATY-
CONSTITUTION BY JUDICIAL FIAT: 
ON THE MARGIN OF THE 
COSTA CASE 
Eric Stein* 
INCREASED interdependence of states in modem times has shaken the nineteenth century doctrines of extreme dualism and posi-
tivism. These doctrines would build an impenetrable wall between 
the international and national legal orders; they would elevate the 
state to the position of exclusive actor and deny the individual any 
standing in the international legal order; and, in the interpretation 
of a rule of law, they would exclude any regard for the political, 
economic, and social context in which the rule is applied. 
This change is reflected in international law and in its instru-
mentalities, including treaties. The number of treaties has multi• 
plied greatly. As the role of government in economic life has broad-
ened, states have tended to include in their treaties clauses designed 
to impose obligations upon and grant rights to not only themselves 
but also individuals. Again, certain common purposes could not be 
achieved without common institutions; thus, states have entered 
into multilateral treaties establishing such institutions for consulta-
tion, coordination, and joint action. Many national constitutions 
have been modernized to allow delegation or transfer of national 
power to new international institutions.1 But, as the need for more 
integrated action increases, states search for new forms of association 
which, although going beyond the traditional organizational pattern, 
stop short of the fully integrated system of a federation. The result 
is a "chiaroscuro" enveloping the basic legal issues such as the hier-
archy of treaty law and national law. 
The European Community2 is such a new association-a "per-
son" in international law, distinct from the member states, with a 
distinct legal order which, however, interacts directly with the legal 
order of the member states. The treaty whereby the Community 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. For excerpts from European constitutions and references to literature, see STEIN 
8: HAY, CASES AND MATERIALS OF THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ATLANTIC AREA 14-37 
(Prelim. ed. 1963). See also Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or Adoption of Interna-
tional Law into Municipal Law, 12 INT'L &: COMP. L.Q. 88 (1963). 
2. For an introduction to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, see l AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PRO· 
FILE 1-99 (Stein &: Nicholson ed. 1960). 
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was established contains no specific clause decreeing supremacy of 
the Community legal order over the legal orders of the member 
states; and the judicial power of the Community Court of Justice is 
substantially more limited than the power of supreme or constitu-
tional courts in contemporary federations. 
As statesmen ponder whether the Community should evolve 
into a federation or a "confederation" in the nature of "Europe des 
patries" and as scholars dispute whether the Community is an "in-
ternational" or "supranational" organization, national courts and 
the Community Court of Justice are faced with an increasing num-
ber of cases that demand immediate and concrete answers to specific 
questions involving the relationship between Community law and 
national law.3 Perhaps the most significant of the recent cases is one 
instituted by Flaminio Costa, a litigious Milanese attorney who car-
ried his opposition to nationalization of electric power in Italy to 
court and, while thus far unsuccessful in his objective, provided the 
impulse for two notable judicial pronouncements: first, a judgment 
of the Italian Constitutional Court4 that wrought consternation 
among the jurists of the Community in Brussels, 5 led to a formal 
parliamentary inquiry in the European Parliament in Strasbourg,6 
and sparked a controversy among scholars in Italy; and second, a 
judgment by the Community Court of Justice of constitutional im-
port.7 
3. Court of Justice of the European Communities, Affaire 6/64, Costa v. E.N.EL., 
Conclusions de M. l'Avocat general Maurice Lagrange, June 25, 1964, at 5 (adv. mimeo. 
French transl.). 
All translations into English in this article are this author's own, except where 
otherwise indicated and except also the translations of the provisions of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community which follow the unofficial 
English version published by the Publishing Services of the European Communities 
8012/5/XII/ 1961/5. 
4. Corte costituzionale, March 7, 1964, n.14, Giur. ital. 1964, I, 1 at 516-19, 522-39; 
and Foro it. 1964, I, at 465-78, with a strongly critical note by Catalano, ibid.; Sentenze 
e ordinanze della Corte costituzionale 1964, at 82; also Giust. civ. 1964, III, 100-07 
with notes by F.B.; PIOLA-CASELLI, Verhiiltniss des EWG-Vertrages :z:um nationalen 
Recht, AUSSENWIRTSCHAFI'SDIBNsr DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 219 (1964) (also critical); Mig-
liazza, La nazionaliuazione dell'energia elettrica e il diritto delle Communita Europee, 
Foro pad. 1964, IV, at 18; Foro pad. 1964, IV, at IO. For a comment written from the 
viewpoint of German law, see Frowein, Zum Verhiiltniss zwischen dem EWG-Recht 
und nationalem Recht aus der Sicht des Gerichtshofes der Europiiischen Gemein-
schaften, AUSSENWIRTSCHAFrSDIBNsr DES BETRIEBs-BERATERS 233 (1964). 
5. The executive Commission of the Community informed the court of its "strong 
apprehension." Avocat gen. Lagrange, supra note 3, at 12. M. Lagrange himself speaks 
of "disastrous consequences." Id. at IO. 
6. Question ecrite no. 27, Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes 2161/64, 
Aug. 11, 1964. 
7. Affaire 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Ente nazionale energia elettrica impresa gia 
della Edison Volta), July 15, 1964 (adv. mimeo. French transl.). For an unofficial English 
translation, see CCH COMMON MARKET REP. CT. DEC. 11 8023 (1964) (with Conclusions 
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I. SIGNOR COSTA GOES TO COURT 
It all started with Mr. Costa's refusal to pay his electricity bill 
in the amount of 1,925 lire (3.08 dollars) to E.N.E.L.,8 the newly 
created governmental body that took over the Milan electric power 
system from a private concern by virtue of the 1962 nationalization 
law and implementing regulations.9 In an action brought before the 
Justice of the Peace (Giudice Conciliatore) of Milan, Costa, in his 
capacity as a consumer of electric power and as a shareholder in the 
nationalized concern, claimed that E.N .E.L. was not entitled to col-
lect the bill because the nationalization law was contrary to the 
Italian Constitution, enumerating the following provisions: the 
constitutional prohibition against parliamentarians voting in pur-
suance of a mandate, the prerequisites for a valid expropriation, 
and the "equal protection clause." In addition, he invoked article 
11 of the Constitution, which provides as follows: 
"Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense to the lib-
erty of other peoples or as a means of settlement of interna-
tional disputes, and, on conditions of equality with the other 
states, agrees to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary to 
an organization which will assure peace and justice among na-
tions, and promotes and encourages international organizations 
constituted for this purpose."10 
It was Costa's contention that the nationalization law contravened 
several specific provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community; that the Community was precisely the type 
of international organization contemplated in article 11; that, by 
adhering to the Community treaty, Italy had agreed to limit its sov-
ereignty in matters embraced by the treaty; and that, since the na-
tionalization law infringed this limitation, which was sanctioned by 
the Constitution, the law was unconstitutional and therefore must 
be held invalid.11 On the basis of this argument, Costa demanded 
that the Milan court obtain a ruling on the issue of constitutionality 
from the Constitutional Court of the Republic, which alone had ju-
risdiction to determine constitutional issues. Moreover, Costa 
argued, whether there was a Community treaty violation de-
of Advocate General Maurice Lagrange, of June 25, 1964). For a comment, see Frowein, 
supra note 4; Gori, La preminenza del diritto della Communita Europea sul diritto 
degli stati membri, Giur. ital. 1964, I, at 1073. 
8. Ente nazionale energia elettrica impresa gia della Edison Volta. 
9. Law of Dec. 6, 1962, n.1643, Gaz. -uff. n.316, Dec. 12, 1962, Leggi e decreti 1962, 
n.1643, at 5523, and subsequent decrees of the President of the Republic. 
10. Translation in 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 275, at 280 (2d ed. 1956). 
ll. Corte costituzionale, March 7, 1964, n.14, supra note 4. 
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pended upon an interpretation of that treaty; and, under article 177 
of the same treaty, only the Community Court of Justice may give 
an authoritative interpretation of its provisions when such a ques-
tion arises in a proceeding before a national court; in such event, a 
national court of last resort is obligated to suspend the proceeding 
and refer the question of interpretation of the treaty provisions for 
"preliminary decision" to the Community Court.12 
By an order of September 10, 1963, the Justice of the Peace of 
Milan obliged Mr. Costa and referred the "preliminary" or "preju-
dicial" question of constitutionality to the Constitutional Court in 
Rome.13 Thus, the stage was set for the first judicial decision in the 
case. 
II. THE HOLDING OF THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The Constitutional Court rendered its judgment on March 7, 
1964.14 It apparently had no difficulty in rejecting the allegations of 
unconstitutionality, except that it had to deal with article 11 for the 
12. Art. 177 provides in full: 
"!he Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision con-
cerning: 
"(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
"(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity; and 
"(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the 
Council, where such statutes so provide. 
"Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the 
Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment de-
pends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice 
to give a ruling thereon. 
"Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court 
or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal law, such court 
or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice," 
For an analysis of article 177, see BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES 179 (1962); Behr, The Relationship Between Community Law and the Law 
of the Member States, in Restrictive Practices, etc., Supp. to the July 1962 INT'L &: Comp. 
L.Q. at I. Also Donner, National Law and the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, 1 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 8, 11 (1963); Lagrange, Les actions 
en justice dans le regime des Communautes europeennes, IO Soc. Ee. WF:r. 81, 99 (1962). 
13. Giudice conciliatore di Milano, Ordinanza Sept. 10, 1963, Foro it. 1963, I, at 
2368. A court is required to transfer the record to the Constitutional Court when two 
conditions are present: first, that "upon summary examination, the issues prove not to 
be manifestly unfounded; the second that it be in the nature of a 'prejudicial' ques-
tion, which in the instant case means that the lawsuit cannot be adjudged without 
recourse to the challenged law." Cassandra, The Constitutional Court of Italy, 8 
AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 6 (1959). There is no appeal to a higher court from a judgment 
of an Italian Justice of the Peace. It has been suggested that in order to be able to 
decide whether the charge of violation of article 11 (and the Community treaty) was 
"manifestly unfounded" the Milan judge was required to interpret the treaty and 
therefore should have first requested such interpretation from the Community Court 
before he could refer this particular issue to the Constitutional Court. Stendardi, 
Discrezionalita ed opportunita del giudice di merito nella remissione di una questione 
pregiudiziale alla Corte di giustizia delle Communita Europee, TEMI 1181 (1963). 
14. Note 4 supra. 
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first time.111 The court interpreted that article as enabling the Italian 
Republic, with a view to the purposes specified therein, to ad-
here to treaties that limit its sovereignty upon approval given in the 
form of an ordinary (as distinguished from a constitutional) law.16 
But, the court held that this ordinary law (and thus any treaty provi-
sion that was thereby incorporated into the Italian legal order) may 
be modified by any other ordinary law of parliament even though 
the adoption of the modifying law would make Italy internationally 
liable for treaty violation. "There is no doubt," the court said, "that 
the state must honor its obligations or that the treaty possesses the ef ~ 
feet given to it by the law which approved it. But since the imperium 
of laws subsequent in time to that law must be maintained any possi-
ble conflict between the two cannot raise questions of constitution-
ality." Because of this conclusion, the court declared it unnecessary to 
deal with the "nature" of the Community, or with the allegation that 
the nationalization law violated the Community treaty, or with the 
suggestion that the Community Court must be asked to interpret the 
treaty provisions concerned.17 
In earlier cases the Constitutional Court had similarly refused to 
interpret article 10 of the Constitution, which provides that "the 
Italian legal order conforms to the generally recognized principles 
of international law," as encompassing treaty law and requiring that 
treaty law be given supremacy over subsequent ordinary law.18 Com-
15. Catalano, supra note 4, at 465. 
16. The court did not accept the interpretation that article 11 had no normative 
content but constituted solely an expression of the direction of foreign policy. For the 
opposite view, see BALI.ADORE PALLIERI, Dnurro CosrrruzioNALE 344-45 (1950) and 
id. at 409-10 (1963). 
17. Giur. ital., supra note 4, at 538-39. It could perhaps be said that by implication 
the Court rejected the argument urged upon it by E.N.E.L. and the Avvocatura dello 
Stato that article 11 applies only to organizations concerned directly with peace and 
justice such as the United Nations, which the Constitution makers clearly had in 
mind, and found instead that it extended also to bodies such as the Community. 
Argument by E.N.E.L. and by Avvocatura dello Stato in Giur. ital., supra note 4, at 
532-83. The Tribunale di Napoli rejected this argument with respect to the European 
Coal and Steel Community Treaty. Sent. April 22, 1964, Foro it. 1964, I, at 1258, 1255. 
See also Pretura di Roma, Ordinanza March 11, 1964, Foro it. I, at 866, 868. The 
two judgments rejected attacks against the constitutionality of the European Coal 
and Steel Community Treaty. The legislative history of the Constitution seems to 
indicate that European organizations such as the Community were intended to be 
included within art. 11. FALZONE, PALERMO &: COSENTINO, LA CosrrruZIONE DELLA RE-
PUBBLICA ITALIANA 43 (1948). The press reports a most recent judgment of the civil 
court of Milan also dealing with the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. 
Europe, CECA, No. 3313, item 17748, Oct. 9, 1964. 
18. Corte costituzionale, May 18, 1960, n.32, Giur. ital. 1960, I, at 1, 1073; id., 
March 11, 1961, n.l, Giur. ital. 1961, I, at 861. The court's position is supported 
by Pizzorusso in Giur. ital. 1961, I, at 866-69, but the general position is opposed 
by QUADRI, DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE Punnuco 47 (1949) and id. at 63 (1960), and 
Cansacclri in Giur. ital. 1960, I, at 1075. But see Miele, L'esecuzione nell'ordina-
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ing, as it did, after this interpretation of article 10, the ruling in the 
Costa case seems to have closed another avenue that might lead to 
recognition in Italian law of the treaty supremacy principle with 
respect to any treaty, including the Community treaty. 
This ruling of the Constitutional Court might have marked the 
end of the story in the Italian legal order. This would have been 
the case had the court of Milan obeyed the Constitutional Court and 
decided the case accordingly without, in the meantime, submitting 
the matter to the Community Court of Justice. Without such a 
submission it would have been for the executive Commission of 
the Community to consider whether Italy, through the failure 
of its courts to abide by article 177, had violated its Commu-
nity treaty obligation and should, therefore, be brought before 
the Community Court.19 However, the Commission was spared this 
task since, even before the Constitutional Court had spoken, the 
same court of Milan in January 1964 issued a further order in which 
it noted Costa's allegation of the violation of the Community treaty, 
suspended the proceeding in Milan, and directed transmission of the 
record to the Community Court of J ustice.20 As a "small claims" 
court from which there was no appeal, the Milan court apparently 
felt obligated according to article 177 to request also a preliminary 
ruling from the Community Court on the treaty issue. 
III. THE TREATY-LAW CoNFLicr BEFORE THE 
COMMUNITY COURT 
A. The Van Gend Case: A New Concept 
The Community Court accepted the reference from Milan de-
spite strenuous opposition to its jurisdiction by the Italian govern-
ment and rendered its judgment on the preliminary question of 
mento italiano degli atti internazionali istitutivi della Communita economica europea 
e Euratom, in 3 RAcCOLTA DI SCRITTI IN ONORE DI A. c. JEMOLO 425, 436 (1963) and 
MIELE, LA CosrITUZIONE ITALIANA E IL Dmrrro INTERNAZIONALE 21 (1951). 
19. See arts. 169, 170 of the Community treaty, infra notes 26 & 27. The Avvocatura 
dello Stato argued that the Constitutional Court could not "submit the case to an inter-
national court" because the Constitutional Court "cannot be placed within the frame-
work of national judicial organs." Giur. ital., supra note 4, at 533. Catalano seems to 
reach the same conclusion, Foro it. 1963, IV, 67. See also 1 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 
318 (1963). On the obligation of other Italian courts to refer questions to the Community 
Court, see Catalano, in Foro it. 1964, V, at 22-24. 
20. Giudice conciliatore di Milano, Ordinanza Jan. 21, 1964, Foro it. 1964, I, 
at 460. In this ordinanza the court also referred to the Constitutional Court the al-
legations that the nationalization law violated still other articles of the Constitution 
that were not mentioned in the ordinanza of Sept. 10, 1963, supra note 13. 
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treaty interpretation on July 15, 1964.21 This judgment, however, 
must be read in conjunction with the opinion of the same court in 
an earlier case that dealt with an essentially identical legal issue. In 
that case, a Dutch importer of German chemicals sued in a Dutch 
court to recover from his government customs duties imposed upon 
him under a Dutch law,22 adopted after the Community treaty went 
into effect, which he claimed had increased the level of customs du-
ties in contravention of an article in the Community treaty prohib-
iting any increase. The defendant Dutch Government claimed that 
this article imposed obligations on member governments only: nei-
ther its text nor the intent of the parties to the treaty permitted an 
interpretation to the effect that an individual could acquire from 
that article a treaty right that he could press in a national court.23 
The Dutch court referred the "preliminary question" of treaty in-
terpretation to the Community Court, which held-disregarding the 
views of the Dutch, Belgian, and German governments and of its 
own Advocate General, and responding instead to the observations 
submitted by the Community Commission-that the treaty article 
in question did indeed create an immediate right in any individual 
in the Community (such as the Dutch importer) to seek relief in na-
tional courts in case of the violation of the prohibition.24 
The Community Court reasoned that, in order to determine 
"whether a provision of an international treaty" did create such a 
right, one must consider "its spirit, its structure (economie), and its 
wording." The Community treaty is "more than a treaty imposing 
mutual obligations upon the contracting governments only"; the ob-
jective was to create a Common Market directly concerning the peo-
ple who as individuals are directly affected by the working of the 
institutions, are called upon to participate as individuals in the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, and 
possess the right in national courts to rely directly upon Community 
21. Affaire 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Ente nazionale energia elettrica impressa gia 
della Edison Volta), July 15, 1964 (adv. mimeo., French transl.). 
22. The new duties were included in the Tarifbesluit (Tariff Ordinance) of March 
1, 1960, which repeated the nomenclature of the protocol of July 25, 1958, concluded 
by Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands and approved by the law of De-
cember 16, 1959. The Community Treaty became effective on Jan. I, 1958. Recueil, 
infra note 24, at 9-10. 
23. The article in question (art. 12) provides: "Member States shall refrain from 
introducing, as between themselves, any new customs duties on importation or ex-
portation or charges with equivalent effect and from increasing such duties or charges 
as they apply in their commercial relations with each other.'' 
24. Affaire 26/62, la societe N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Ondememing 
van Gend &: Loos c. !'administration fiscale neerlandaise, Feb. 5, 1963, II (I) Recueil 
de la Jurisprudence de la Cour I (1963). For an unofficial English translation, see 
CCH COMMON MARKET REP. CT. DEC. ,I 8008 (1963). 
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law as interpreted ultimately by the Community Court. The Court 
held: 
"The Community constitutes a new legal order of international 
law for the benefit of which states have restricted their sover-
eign power in specified limited areas and whose subjects are not 
only the member states but their nationals as well. Thus Com-
munity law which is independent of the legislation of the mem-
ber states, while imposing obligations upon individuals also 
creates rights which become part of their legal patrimony (patri-
moine juridique). Such rights arise not only when they are ex-
plicitly stated in the treaty, but also through obligations which 
the treaty imposes in a definite manner not only upon indi-
viduals but also upon member states and Community institu-
tions."25 
The fact, the Court added, that the member states and the Com-
mission have the authority to institute a proceeding for bringing a 
treaty violation before the Community Court under articles 16926 
and 17027 does not mean that individuals whose rights were im-
paired by the same violation could not pursue national remedies for 
the violation in national courts. Their right to do so is an added 
guarantee against treaty violations. 
In this broad, novel context the court found that the article in 
question, having laid down a clear and unconditional prohibition 
against raising tariffs that "by its very nature lends itself perfectly" 
to producing a direct effect upon persons without any need for legis-
lation by member states, must be interpreted as "having direct effect 
and giving rise to individual rights which the national courts must 
vindicate," regardless of the fact that it designates the states as sub-
jects of the obligation.28 
25. Recueil de Ia Jurisprudence, supra note 24, at 23. 
26. "If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill any 
of its obligations under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after requiring such State to submit its comments. 
"If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion within the 
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may refer the matter to the 
Court of Justice." 
27. "Any Member State which considers that another Member State has failed 
to fulfill any of its obligations under this Treaty may refer the matter to the 
Court of Justice. 
"Before a Member State institutes, against another Member State, proceedings 
relating to an alleged infringement of the obligations under this Treaty, it shall 
refer the matter to the Commission. 
"The Commission shall give a reasoned opinion after the States concerned 
have been required to submit their comments in written and oral pleadings. 
"If the Commission, within a period of three months after the date of refer• 
ence of the matter to it, has not given an opinion, reference to the Court of 
Justice shall not thereby be prevented." 
28. Recueil de Ia Jurisprudence, supra note 24, at 23-25. This case has received 
extensive attention in legal periodicals, e.g., Biilow, Zur unmittelbaren Wirkung von 
Stillhalteverpfiichtungen im EWG-Vertrag, AussENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETIUEBS• 
January 1965] Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution 499 
However, this is as far as the Court was prepared to go. Although 
it spoke of Community law "which is independent of the laws of the 
member states" and of treaty rights of individuals which "national 
courts must vindicate," the Court failed to specify that these rights 
must prevail over conflicting national legislation. The Court was 
not to take this next step until two years later in the Costa affair, 
and then only after the Italian Constitutional Court had given its 
opinion in the same matter. 
B. The Next Step: The Costa Judgment 
When the request for a "preliminary decision" in the Costa case 
reached the Community Court in 1964, that court was doubtlessly 
cognizant of the ruling by the Italian Constitutional Court in the 
same case. This ruling caused concern in Community circles, not 
necessarily because of any belief that the nationalization law in fact 
violated the Community treaty, but rather because of the holding 
of the Italian Constitutional Court that the Milan court must disre-
gard a treaty right if it conflicts with a subsequent national law. 
Faced with this challenge to the supremacy of Community law, 
the Community Court started from the basic concept formulated 
in the Van Gend case that, "unlike ordinary international treaties," 
the Community treaty established a distinct legal order. That order, 
the court said in developing this concept further, "has been inte-
grated with the legal orders of member states" and their courts are 
bound by it: 
"In effect, by establishing the Community of unlimited 
duration possessing its own institutions, personality, legal 
capacity, capacity of international representation and more 
particularly effective powers derived from a limitation of the 
authority of states members of the Community or from the trans-
l er of their powers, these states have curtailed their sovereign 
BERATERS 162 (1963); Gori, Una pietra miliare nell'afjermazione del diritto europeo, 
Giur. it. 1963, IV, at 49; Hay, Federal Jurisdiction of the Common Market Court, 12 
AM. J. COMP. L. 21, 36 (1963); Jeantet, Observations, JURISCLASS. PER. 1963, II, at 13177; 
Riesenfeld & Buxbaum, N.V. Algemene Transport, etc., 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 152 (1964); 
Rigaux, Observations, 1963 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 190; Robert, Sur une egalite de 
droits devant la C.e.e. des ressortissants des Etats membres avec ces Etats eux-memes, 
REC, SIREY 1963, Chron. 29; Rodiere, L'art. 177 du, Traite de Rome, etc., Foro it. 1964, V, 
at 1, 4; Ronzitti, Foro it. 1964, IV, at 98; Rousseau, Note, 1963 REv. GtN. DE DRorr INT. 
Pua. 421; "Sk." (Samkalden], Comment, 11 Soc. Ee. WET. 227 (1963). 
On the Van Gend case and the problem generally, see six separate reports prepared 
for the Second International Colloque of European Law published for the Association 
of European Jurists, Paris, by N. V. Uitgeversmaatschappij W. E. J. Tjeenk Willink 
Zwolle under the title Le probleme de l'applicabilite directe et immediate des normes 
des traites instituant les Communautes Europeennes, Rapporteurs: Catalano et Monaco 
(Italy); Jacomet (France); Ter Kuile (The Netherlands); Ophiils (Germany); Rigaux 
(Belgium); Rapporteur General Erades. 
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rights, albeit in limited areas and thus created a body of law 
which applies to their nationals and to themselves as well. 
"The integration of Community law with the law of each 
member state, and more generally the letter and spirit of the 
treaty make it impossible, as a corollary effect, for the states to 
accord superiority to a subsequent unilateral measure over a 
legal order which was accepted on the basis of reciprocity.''29 
Since the Court was unable to point to a specific "supremacy" 
provision in the treaty it had to rely on general provisions in addi-
tion to the basic concept. To tolerate interference with the direct 
effect of Community law by member states would, the court rea-
soned, jeopardize compliance with their treaty obligation "to abstain 
from any measures likely to impair the attainment of the treaty ob-
jectives" (Art. 5(2)), bring about discrimination on grounds of nation-
ality which the treaty prohibits (Art. 7), and render treaty obliga-
tions contingent rather than unconditional. The treaty expressly 
specifies the instances, the court proceeded, when a member state 
may act unilaterally and when it must request authorization. These 
provisions and the provision that makes regulations issued by Com-
munity institutions "directly applicable in all member states"30 
would be meaningless if a member could defeat its obligations 
simply by enacting a contrary national law. 
These factors, taken together, led the court to conclude that 
the law "born of the treaty" and "issuing from an independent 
source" cannot, because of its "specific, original character," be de-
feated in a national court by any "provision of national law without 
jeopardizing the legal base of the Community itself.'' The transfer 
of certain rights and obligations from the legal orders of the member 
states to the legal order of the Community has brought about a 
definitive limitation of sovereign rights, and this limitation is im-
mune from a subsequent unilateral act. Thus, if, as in the Costa 
case, a party to a litigation in a national court relies on a treaty 
right and it is necessary to interpret the treaty to determine whether 
such right exists, article 177 must be applied and the Community 
Court must be asked to render the interpretation regardless of any 
national law that may have been enacted subsequently to the treaty 
purporting to modify it. 
29. P. 11 of the mimeographed text. (Emphasis added.) 
30. Art. 189 provides: " •.. Regulations shall have a general application. They 
shall be binding in every respect and directly applicable in each Member State .••• " 
Art. 191 provides: "The regulations shall be published in the Official Gazette of 
the Community. They shall enter into force on the date fixed in them or, failing this, 
on the twentieth day following their publication. . .. " 
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The court nevertheless recognized the limits of its judicial power 
derived from the allocation of jurisdiction between it and the 
national courts under article 177: the Community Court, on refer-
ence from the Milan court, could only interpret the treaty provi-
sions "taking account of the legally relevant data set forth by the 
[court of Milan]," but it could not declare a specific Italian law 
void as contrary to treaty law.31 This function under the treaty was 
reserved to the Italian court. 
Having reached these general conclusions, the court proceeded 
to examine the treaty provisions that Costa, in his action in Milan, 
alleged were violated by the Italian nationalization law. In the 
pattern set by the Van Gend case, the court interpreted these pro-
visions in order to determine whether they created rights upon 
which individuals like Costa could rely in national courts. Of the 
four provisions invoked, the court interpreted two (article 53 and 
a section of article 37) as creating such rights, while the remaining 
two (articles 102 and 93(1)) the court viewed as imposing obliga-
tions on states only and not as benefiting individuals directly.32 The 
31. P. 10. The court noted on the same page that under article 177 it may render 
an interpretation of a treaty in a "preliminary decision" but "it cannot apply the 
treaty to a specific case nor pass upon the validity of an internal measure under the 
treaty as it could do within the framework of art. 169." In the first case under 
article 177, the court rendered a strictly "abstract" interpretation, that is, one not 
specifically related to the case before the national court; but the Community Court 
upheld its right to redefine the questions put to it by the national court in the light 
of the record of the case and the facts therein. Affaire No. 13/61 Geus c. Bosch et 
Van Rijn, April 6, 1962, VIII (1) Recueil de la Jurisprudence 89 (1962). The court 
has followed this pattern in subsequent cases. Bebr believes that the court need not 
limit itself to an abstract interpretation. Bebr (supp.), supra note 12, at 14. 
32. More specifically, the court concluded that article 102, prescribing a procedure 
for the prevention of "distortions" of competition by enactment of new national laws, 
and article 93(1) and (2), dealing with procedures before the Commission regarding 
removal of state subsidies, imposed obligations upon the member states only and did 
not create individual rights. On the other hand, article 53, prohibiting any new re-
strictions on the right of establishment, being "complete" and capable of direct effect 
upon individuals, was held to create individual rights. The court pointed out, how-
ever, that this article is not infringed by a new law as long as nationals of other 
member states under the new law are not treated less favorably than local nationals. 
Costa argued that the nationalization law, by excluding all private persons, Italians 
as well as nationals of other member states, from access to an important sector of 
Italian economy, violated article 53. Finally, responding to the charge that the na-
tionalization law violated article 37 which prohibits, inter alia, any new state monopo-
lies of a specified nature, the court held that this prohibition is also directly enforce-
able in national courts. The court defined the prohibited monopoly as one introducing 
new discrimination among Community nationals in conditions of supply and demand 
with respect to transactions in a product in the flow of commerce that may be the 
subject of competition and trade, providing that the monopoly affects such trade. 
It will be for the national judge, the court concluded, to determine whether any 
new law (such as the Italian nationalization law) in effect introduces a prohibited 
monopoly that may affect imports and exports among nationals of member states. 
Pp. 13-17 of the mimeographed text. 
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record of the case along with the Community Court's judgment 
was then duly returned to the Milan court. 
IV. THE CoNFLicr BETWEEN Two CouRTs 
The court of Milan, having pursued the two procedures pre-
scribed by Italian law and the Community treaty, respectively, thus 
received a ruling from the Community Court that treaty rights 
must be given precedence over any conflicting national law; on the 
other hand, it was directed by the Italian Constitutional Court to 
apply the national law as lex posterior, whether or not it impaired 
a treaty right. 
An attempt to pursue the predicament of the Milan court into 
the complex interstices of Italian law and procedure would exceed 
the scope of this article and the c.ompetence of this writer. As a 
practical matter, although the issue of constitutionality is presently 
again before the Italian Constitutional Court with reference to 
other articles of the Constitution, there is no indication that the 
court will show more sympathy for the second attack against the 
nationalization law than it did for the first challenge. Again, al-
though the question of whether the nationalization law conformed 
to the treaty has been under consideration by the Commission of 
the Community, there is little evidence, judging from the Commis-
sion's views summarized in the Community Court's judgment, that 
the Commission has reached or is likely to reach a conclusion ad-
verse to the Italian Government. Since public ownership as such is 
not incompatible with the treaty,83 the only question that could 
arise would be whether certain features of the law or its application 
constituted a concealed subsidy, a prohibited monopoly, or dis-
crimination. 
However, these pragmatic considerations do not alleviate in 
any way the seriousness of the conflict between the two courts on the 
basic issue of the normative hierarchy in the Community and na-
tional legal orders. Three questions arise: 
I. Do the Community treaty and regulations give rise to 
rights that individuals can enforce in national courts? 
2. In the Community legal order (and before the Com-
munity Court), is a right that is derived from the Community 
treaty or from a Community regulation (as authoritatively inter-
preted by the Community Court) superior to national law even 
if the latter is subsequent in time? 
33. Article 222 provides that the treaty "shall in no way prejudice the system 
existing in Member States in respect of property." 
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3. If the answers are in the affirmative, must the supremacy 
be given effect by national courts; and what is the legal situa-
tion if the traditional national constitutional practice governing 
"directly applicable" (or "self-executing") treaties does not en-
sure such effect? 
There is no doubt that the Van Gend case answered the first 
question in the affirmative. One phase of the lively debate surround-
ing that case centered precisely on whether the judgment provided 
-or, in fact, could provide-a reply also to the second or possibly to 
the third of these questions. According to the most conservative 
view, the judgment was nothing more than an elaboration of a rule 
enunciated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its 
advisory opinion on the access of certain individuals to the Danzig 
courts, in which the Court recognized for the first time-and con-
trary to the "classic" doctrine-the existence in international law 
of "self-executing" treaties and provided a rule for their inter-
pretation. Whether a treaty grants given individuals rights that they 
may press in national courts "depends," the courts concluded, "upon 
the intention of the contracting parties": 
"(A]ccording to a well established principle of international 
law, ... an international agreement, cannot, as such, create 
direct rights and obligations for private individuals. But it ca~-
not be disputed that the very object of an international agree-
ment, according to the intention of the contracting parties, may 
be the adoption by the parties of some definite rules creating 
individual rights and obligations and enforceable in national 
courts. That there is such an intention in the present case can be 
established by reference to the terms of the [agreement] .... "84 
114. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 15, at 17-18 (1928) 
(advisory opinion). "The intention of the parties," the Court continued, "which is to 
be ascertained from the contents of the Agreement, taking into consideration the 
manner in which the Agreement has been applied, is decisive. This principle of in-
terpretation should be applied by the Court in the present case. Wording and general 
tenor ••• show provisions directly applicable ••• .'' (Emphasis added.) 
Cf. the classic American definition of a "self-executing" treaty by Mr. Chief Justice 
Marshall: 
"A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative 
act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially 
so far as its operation is intra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the 
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. 
"In the United States, a different principle is established. Our Constitution 
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in 
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates 
of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the 
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform 
a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a 
rule for the court.'' 
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
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The holding in the Van Gend case, it could be argued (if one 
wishes to disregard the broad language of the Community Court in 
the "Reasons" of the judgment), was merely an application of this 
rule of interpretation to another ordinary international treaty by 
another international court; at most, the Community Court, in inter-
preting the Community treaty, could be said to have modified the 
Danzig rule to the extent that it discarded the rebuttable presump-
tion against the "self-executing" effect, which some had read into 
that rule, or even found a presumption for (instead of against) the 
direct applicability,85 or considered a provision "directly applicable" 
even when the specific language of the provision addressed itself 
to states exclusively.86 In any event, according to this view, since the 
court said nothing about the supremacy of Community treaty law, 
it obviously did not answer the second or third of the questions; and, 
since in principle the Community treaty must be treated like any 
other treaty, the effect to be given to a "directly applicable" pro• 
vision of that treaty-and to a right "'arising under it-will depend 
on the national constitutional law and practice concerning treaties. 
That is clearly the position the Italian Constitutional Court took 
before the Community Court had rendered its decision in the Costa 
case. 
It is beyond dispute that in the Costa case the Community Court 
provided an answer to the second question by declaring the absolute 
supremacy of Community law over national law. Is it possible, or 
even necessary, however, to interpret this judgment to the effect 
that whether such supremacy will prevail in national courts will 
still depend upon national constitutional law and practice? 
V. A SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH TRADITIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
National practice, as Professor Ophiils points out, is based on 
variations of one of two basic doctrines: One, derived from natural 
law thinking and reflected in the Permanent Court's opinion, is 
embodied in the United States Constitution, which requires na-
tional courts to apply a "self-executing" provision of a treaty as 
the "supreme law of the land."81 This effect attaches the moment 
35. Jacomet, supra note 28, at 7-10, 14. 
36. Rigaux, Rapporteur, supra note 28, at 26-27; Rousseau, 1963 REv. GtN. DE 
DROIT INT. PuB. 421-22. 
37. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
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the treaty comes into force and no legislative measure is required. 
Treaty supremacy is absolute with respect to the law of component 
states of the Union. Theoretically, if the concept of "higher law" 
were to prevail completely, this treaty supremacy should also be 
absolute with respect to federal law and should extend not only to 
preexisting but also to subsequent federal law. Both Jefferson38 and 
J ay39 assumed this to be the case. However, according to a rule 
evolved by the United States Supreme Court, a treaty modifies a 
preexisting conflicting federal law but is itself modified by subse-
quent federal law if the two cannot be reconciled.40 
The other doctrine, inspired by the theory of strict separation 
of international and national law, does not admit of "direct applica-
bility" and requires in each case a "transformation" of treaty law 
into the national legal order. Since under this view a treaty pro-
vision can become applicable as national law only if "transformed" 
by legislative action, a subsequent national law will have to be given 
predominance by the courts if it is contrary to a treaty provision. 
In the Italian constitutional practice, which is inspired by the 
transformation doctrine, a law of parliament is required in order 
to make a treaty provision applicable with the effect of law in na-
tional courts.41 If the Community treaty is an "ordinary" treaty ap-
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing." 
38. Jefferson said in 1790: "A treaty is the law of the land, and a law of superior 
order, because it not only repeals past law, but cannot itself be repealed by future 
ones." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1841 
(1891): "Yet Mr. Jefferson afterwards (in Nov. 1793) seems to have fluctuated in opin-
ion, and to have been unsettled as to the nature and extent of the treaty-making 
power." (Referring to 4 JEFFERSON'S CORR.ESP. 497, 498.) 
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 394 (Rossiter ed. 1961). 
40. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 
104 F.2d 67 (C.C.P.A. 1939), and other cases listed in HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL AND 
INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW 174 (1958). 
41. Generally the parliament adopts a single law containing both an authorization 
to ratify and an "order of execution." The Italian law on the European Economic 
Community Treaty of Oct. 14, 1957, No. 1203, 1957 Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei 
decreti 3973. See also art. 80 of the Italian Constitution; LA PERGOLA, CoSTITUZIONE 
E ADATTAMENTO DELL'ORDINAMENTO INTERNO AL DllUTTO INTERNAZIONALE 318-19 (1961); 
2 PERASSI, LEzIONl DI DlRlTTO INTERNAZI0NALE 33 (1950); Catalano &: Monaco, supra 
note 28, at 1-3; Perassi, L'etat dans la communaute internationale, in LA CONSTITU-
TION ITALIENNE DE 1948, at 223, 238-39 (Crosa ed. 1950); Udina, Sull'efficacia delle 
norme delle Communita europee nell'ordinamento italiano in 3 RAccoLTA DI SCRIT1£ 
IN ONORE DI A. C. JEMOLO 697, 704 (1963). Unlike treaty law, as indicated above, "gen-
erally recognized principles of international law" are given constitutional superiority 
by article 10 of the Italian Constitution. 
But see QuADRI, op. cit. supra note 18, who claims that article 10 of the Constitu-
tion, because it embraces the rule pacta sunt seroanda brings about an "adattamento 
automatico" (automatic adaptation) of treaty provisions into Italian law; the "ordine di 
esecuzione" has merely the function of promulgation or publication. Such treaty 
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proved by an ordinary (as distinguished from constitutional) law, 
any subsequent ordinary law must be applied in Italian courts even 
if it is contrary to the treaty. This is precisely the view taken by 
the Italian Constitutional Court, which did not even take note of 
the new concept proclaimed and defined in the Van Gend case 
that the Community treaty was a unique type of treaty. 
It could be argued that, had the Community Court in the Van 
Gend case expressly stated the rule of absolute supremacy as it did 
two years later, the outcome before the Italian Constitutional Court 
might have been different. There was nothing in the Van Gend 
case-except perhaps the constitutional situation in The Nether-
lands, 42 judicial restraint, or concern with possible political reper-
cussions-that would have prevented the Community Court from 
taking this step at that time. However, it is questionable whether 
even an express statement of supremacy would have swayed the 
Italian Constitutional Court, considering the general attitude mani-
fested by that court and by the Avvocatura dello Stato. The judg-
ment-summary and brief as it is on this issue--contains not a hint 
that the court was prepared to accept the new idea of the Com-
munity and was willing even to consider anything except the tradi-
tional· zex posterior derogat priori rule that is applicable to treaties 
generally. One cannot, however, go so far as to assume that the 
consequences of the application of this rule were not envisaged by 
the learned constitutional judges. As was shown earlier, the question 
of Community law supremacy arises not only in connection with 
directly applicable treaty provisions but particularly, and more im-
portantly, with respect to Community law in the form of regulations 
by which the Council, and to a limited extent the Commission, are 
required to evolve the legal framework for the economic union and 
which, under the treaty, become effective in the national legal orders 
directly upon adoption by the respective Community organ. What 
would be the value and logic of this scheme if, for instance, in the 
antitrust field the Italian Parliament, unwilling to allow the en-
forcement of Regulation 17 of the Council of Ministers, could adopt 
a law nullifying the effects of that regulation in Italy? It surely is 
no answer to say that any other member government or the Com-
mission would be entitled to bring a complaint against Italy before 
provisions enjoy constitutional-level supremacy even over subsequent law of parlia-
ment. 
42. Art. 66 of the Netherlands Constitution-as amended-expressly assures su-
premacy of treaty provisions "by which everyone is bound" over even subsequent 
legislation. See note 48 infra. 
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the Community Court.43 The fact is that for a long time to come, 
national authorities in antitrust and other fields will play a vital 
role in the application and enforcement of Community law, and 
member states have relied on such reciprocal enforcement as an 
essential component of the treaty scheme which is unique precisely 
because of its impact upon individuals. If this component of the 
scheme can be neutralized by a simple law of parliament, the legal 
security of the system will be reduced even if thus far there is every 
indication that no parliament will act lightly in violation of Com-
munity law. 
It is not difficult to understand how a court, concerned exclu-
sively with its own constitutional scene, would reach the conclusion 
the Italian court reached in the Costa case. The astonishing reference 
in the court's opinion to the executive Commission of the Community 
as the "advisory" Commission44 suggests lack of familiarity with Com-
munity law. Italy, of all member states, is geographically farthest 
from the seats of the Community institutions and thus is most re-
mote from their activities. Again, the politically explosive nature of 
the nationalization issue may have conceivably influenced the 
Avvocatura dello Stato toward seeking to block any possible avenue 
through which the nationalization law could be questioned. Finally, 
one wonders to what extent the judgment reflects the present state 
of legal thought in Italy, which, to a substantial extent, remains 
under the influence of the nineteenth century type of positivism.45 
If the Constitutional Court had been so inclined it surely could 
have found a way to accept the supremacy of Community law even 
without impairing traditional Italian constitutional practice. It 
could have interpreted article 11 of the Constitution to the effect 
that any national law contrary to a treaty falling within the scope 
of that article (such as the Community treaty) is unconstitutional. 
This view, which would have assured the Community treaty (and 
all treaties included in article II) the hierarchical position of a con-
stitutional law, was urged upon the court in the Costa case and 
finds support among some writers.46 Since in principle the Consti-
tutional Court, before passing upon the compatibility of a national 
43. See arts. 169 and 170, supra notes 26 and 27. 
44. Giur. ital., supra note 4, at 533. 
45. Cf. in another context, Gorla, Lo studio interno e comparativo della giurispru-
denza e i suoi presupposti: le raccolte e le tecniche per la interpretazione delle 
sentenze, Foro it. 1964, V, 73, especially § 3, § 6 notes 41 and 44 for observations of 
interest concerning legal education and thought in Italy. 
46. Catalano, Foro it. 1964, I, at 466-75 and Foro it. 1964, V, at 24; also "F.B.,'' 
in Giust. civ. 1964, III, at 102-03; Gori, supra note 28; Piola-Caselli, supra note 4. 
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law with the treaty, would have to have before it an interpretation 
of the treaty by the Community Court, this view would have also 
assured compliance with article 177. 
It is noteworthy that a similar difficulty in assuring supremacy of 
Community law over later national law could arise in Germany, 
which also follows the "transformation" doctrine; the German con-
stitutional provisions governing the treaty-federal law relationship 
resemble the Italian pattern. In particular, article 24 of the German 
Basic Law-like article 11 of the Italian Constitution-contemplates 
transfer of sovereign powers to international organizations and 
limitation on national sovereignty. However, there has been no 
final judicial determination as yet of the issue whether subsequent 
federal legislation modifies an earlier treaty or an act of an interna-
tional organization. On this question the writers disagree:n On the 
other hand, there should be little difficulty in The Netherlands, 
where the Constitution was amended in 1953 in order to ensure 
supremacy in national courts of any "directly applicable" treaty 
provisions.48 In France, the Constitution specifically decrees treaty 
supremacy over national law, whether enacted before or after the 
date of the treaty, and the trend in the jurisprudence appears to be 
in the direction of requiring the national judge to enforce the 
47. Art. 24 of the Basic Law of 1949: 
"(I) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to inter-
national organizations. 
"(2) In order to preserve peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual 
collective security; in doing so it will consent to those limitations of its sovereign 
powers which will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe 
and among the nations of the world. • • ." 
Art. 25 of the Basic Law: 
"The general rules of international law shall form part of federal law. They 
shall take precedence over domestic law and create rights and duties directly for 
the inhabitants of the federal territory." 
Translation from 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 34 (2d ed. 1956). See also arts. 
59, 79(1). Frowein discusses the conflicting views and includes ample references to 
literature. He concludes that Ipsen, Maunz, Nicolaysen, and Geitz appear to interpret 
art. 24 as assuring Community law supremacy over later national law, but Jaenicke 
disagrees. Frowein, supra note 4, at 237. 
See also Menzel, Die Geltung internazionaler Vertriige im innerstaalichen Recht, 
DEUTSCHE LANDESREFERATE ZUM VI. INTERNAZIONALEN KoNGRESS FUR R.ECHTSVERGLEI• 
CHUNG IN HAMBURG 1962, SoNDERVER0FFENTI.ICHUNG VON RAIIELS ZEITSCHRIFT 401 (1962); 
Mosler, L'application du droit international public par les tribunaux nationaux, 91 
R.EcuEIL DES CouRS 625 (1957); Miinch, Delimitation du domain du droit des Com-
munautes, etc., 2 Acrns OFFICIELS DU CoNGRES INTERNATIONAL D'ETUDES SUR LA CECA 
271, 289 (Stresa 1957); Preuss, On Amending the Treaty-Making Power: a Com-
i7arative Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1117, 
1132 (1953); Schlochauer, Das Verhiiltniss des Rechts der Europiiischen Wirtschafts-
gemeinschaft zu den nationalen Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten, 11 ARCHIV DES 
VoLKERRECHTS 1 (1963). 
48. ERADES &: GOULD, THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL 
LAw IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE UNITED STATES (1961); Van Panhuys, The Neth-
erlands Constitution and International Law, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (1964). 
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rule. The application of this rule in France, however, is conditioned 
upon reciprocal acceptance of the same rule by other parties to the 
treaty. This opens the possibility for French "retaliation" if Italy 
follows the rule declared by its Constitutional Court in the Costa 
case.49 The Supreme Court of Luxembourg has established firmly 
the rule of absolute treaty supremacy by its own jurisprudence.50 As 
for Belgium, where the Constitution is silent on this point, the Pro-
cureur General at the Supreme Court only recently denied that the 
rule giving preference to subsequent law over treaty law has been 
accepted by the Supreme Court, and instead he foreshadowed an 
evolution of the jurisprudence toward treaty supremacy, particularly 
as concerns the European integration treaties.51 The trend in the 
member states thus appears to be distinctly toward the supremacy of 
all treaties-another fact that one would assume would have pro-
vided food for thought for the high Italian court. This brief survey 
confirms, however, that the problem as it has arisen in Italy of 
assuring supremacy to Community law might also occur in Germany 
and possibly in Belgium if the traditional constitutional practice 
concerning international treaties is followed in national courts. 
VI. THE .ABSOLUTE SUPREMACY SOLUTION 
It has been argued with considerable persuasiveness that the 
Community treaty, as interpreted by the Community Court, calls 
for a new doctrinal basis upon which "absolute" supremacy of 
Community law over national law, including constitutional law, 
must be founded and enforced both in the Community and national 
legal orders. 
49. Art. 55 of the Constitution of 1958. Could it be argued that, since the Com• 
munity treaty is not an ordinary treaty based upon reciprocal obligations but rather 
a unique treaty based upon acceptance of common rules, France could not invoke the 
reciprocity condition in article 55 of its Constitution? On the treaty-law relation, see 
Chevallier, Le droit de la Communaute Europeenne et les jurisdictions franr;aises, 1962 
REv. DU DROIT PUB. ET DE LA SCIENCE POL. 646; Vignes, L'autorite des traites internatio-
naux en droit interne, :£TUDES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN, XXIII TRAVAUX ET RECHER.CHES 
DE L'INSTITUT DE DRorr COMPARE DE L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS 475 (1962). For a recent 
case in which Conseil d'Etat found no conflict between the Community treaty and 
a Ministerial Decree, see Conseil d'Etat, Assemblee, June 19, 1964, in 1964 DRorr 
AnMINISTRATIF 438, with a note by Laubadere. 
50. Chambre des Metiers-Pagani v. Ministere Public, Cour sup. de Justice (Cass 
Crim.) July 14, 1954, 16 P.L.J. 150; Pescatore, L'autorite en droit interne des traites 
internationaux selon la jurisprudence luxembourgeoise, 18 PASICRISIE LUXEMBOURGEOISE 
99 (1962). 
51. Hayoit de Termicourt, Le conflit 'Traite-Loi interne', 1963 JOURNAL DES TRIBu-
NAUX 431. Contra, Rigaux, Rapport supra note 28, at 39; Rigaux, Les problemes de la 
validite souleves devant les tribunaux nationaux, par les rapports juridiques existant 
entre la constitution de' l'etat, d'une part, et les traites, etc., 1 PROBLEMES CONTEMPO· 
RAINS DE DROIT COMPARE 181, 209 (Tokyo 1962). 
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According to one view, 52 the member states, by relinquishing 
their sovereign rights in specified areas and transferring them to 
the Community, have removed the obstacles (based upon national 
sovereignty and reflected in national constitutional practice) that 
would normally stand in the way of direct effect of the treaty in 
national law, and thus have created an entirely new and different 
concept of "immediate applicability." Upon conclusion of the treaty 
providing for such transfer, the sovereign rights that were thereby 
transferred to the Community were amalgamated in the hands of a 
new legal person, thus bringing about a division of jurisdiction 
with respect to subject matter between the Community on one 
hand and the member states on the other. While under the Ameri-
can doctrine of "self-executing treaties" a treaty provision becomes 
effective in national law "with the assistance of the sovereign," and 
under the transformation doctrine "through the means supplied by 
the sovereign," under this new doctrine embodied in the Commu-
nity treaty the effect upon national law occurs as a result of a breach 
or "break-through" (Durchgriff) of sovereignty. Thus, when a state 
enacts a law that is contrary to an ordinary treaty, it violates inter-
national law, but the law itself is valid. However, when a member 
state enacts a law contrary to a directly applicable Community law 
provision, it attempts to act beyond and outside its sovereignty 
(not unlike a state seeking to act beyond its territorial sovereignty), 
and the law is a nullity. When a national court is called upon to 
apply Community law, it is in the same position as a state court in 
the United States or a court of a German Land when they are re-
quired to apply federal law. In this system there is clearly no place 
for the lex posterior rule. This means that a national court can no 
longer apply a national law that conflicts with Community law (as 
interpreted by the Community Court) even though the Community 
Court did not (and could not) specifically pass upon the validity of 
that national law in a proceeding under article 177.63 
52. Ophiils, supra note 28, at 25-27; Quellen und Aufbau des Europiiischen Gemein-
schaftsrechts, 1963 N.J.W. 1697, 1698. See also Ipsen, Europiiisches Gemein-
schaftsrecht, 1964 id. at 339, 342, listing Bayer, Glaesner, Kraus, Matthies, Mu':1\, 
Schnorr, Wohlfart as supporting Ophiils. Similarly Cahier, Le droit interne des 
organisations internationales, REv. GtN. DE DRorr INT. Pus. 563, 601-02 (1963). See 
generally STENDARDI, RAPPORT! FRA ORDINAMENTI GIURIDICI ITALIANO E DELLE COM• 
MUNITA EUR0PEE 34 (1958); Ipsen, Rapport du droit des Communautes Europt!ennes 
avec le droit national, LE DROIT ET LES .AFFAIRES, Doc. LXXXIV, No. 47, Oct. 26, 1964. 
53. In a proceeding under articles 169 and 170, the Community Court can declare 
such a law contrary to the treaty. Ophiils appears to suggest that in such a proceed-
ing the Community Court can declare the law void with direct effect in national law 
(Bericht, supra note 28, at 26-27) while Rigaux holds that a court's decision in that 
proceeding "has no immediate effect in the internal legal order and .binds the state 
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Another view, purporting to reject the international law concepts 
of treaty~national law relationship as well as federal-state analogies, 
is based upon the apparently simple proposition that the Community 
treaty itself embodies the principle that "Community law supersedes 
national law." This unwritten rule is necessarily implied by the 
treaty and by the very nature of the Community because it is func-
tionally indispensable for the very existence of the Community and 
for the achievement of the objectives laid down by the member states 
in the treaty. 54 The need for such a rule springs from the necessity to 
ensure uniform effect and application of Community law and thus 
to avoid the divergencies and discriminations that might arise from 
the differing national constitutional practices described in the pre-
ceding section. The rule is thus derived from the treaty through a 
principle of interpretation. It is pointed out that the Community 
Court itself resorted to the principle of implied power when it 
sought to determine the limits upon the powers of the institutions 
of the Community.55 This principle is reflected in a federal context 
in United States law,56 and it was applied in an international organi-
zation context when the International Court of Justice concluded 
only." Rigaux, Observations, 1963 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 190, 191. This was also 
the position of the Italian Government in the Costa case, as quoted by Advocate 
General Lagrange in his Conclusions, supra note 7, at 3-4. Although Rigaux concludes 
that a Belgian judge is bound by a decision of the Community Court under article 
177 and his judgment disregarding such a decision would be annulled by the Cour de 
Cassation, he seems to make this conditional upon "internal constitutional law." 
Id. at 191-92. 
Catalano and Monaco appear to agree with Ophiils that transfer of jurisdiction to 
the Community brings about, as a corollary, lack of jurisdiction of member states. 
Their emphasis is on the difference between the Community and other treaties with 
reference to "will formation." Acts of the institutions of the Community are not 
the result of the "fusion" of the will of the states (as are international treaties) but 
they express a new will of a Community organ. But these two authors, while insisting 
that the concept of direct applicability under the Community treaty is different from 
that of a "self-executing" treaty, do not deal expressly with the position of a national 
judge faced with a conflict between the treaty (or a Community act) and a later 
national law. Rapport, supra note 28, at 8-9, passim. 
54. Zweigert, Der Einfluss des Europiiischen Gemeinschaftsrechts und die Rechts-
ordnung der Mitgliedstaaten, RABELS ZEITScHRIIT 1964 (in press). See also Gaudet, 
Incidences des Communautt!s europeennes sur le droit interne des t!tats membres, 
ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE Daorr DE LIEGE 5, 21 (1963), who suggests that the "pri-
ority" of the Community law is necessary for the same reasons that require priority 
to be given a social group interest over "partial" interest. 
55. Zweigert cites as examples Case No. 8/55 in VII Sammlung der Rechtsprechung 
des Gerichtshofes 296, 312; Case No. 20/59, id. VI, at 685, 708; and Case No. 25/59, 
id. VI, at 747, 781. All pertain to the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. 
56. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1960); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitu-
tional Law, 29 YALE L.J. 137 (1919-20). 
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that the United Nations possessed certain implied powers not speci-
fied in its Charter. 57 
Both views appear to lead to the following conclusion in Italian 
and German law: Since the Community treaty, embodying the 
supremacy rule, was adhered to by Italy in accordance with article 
11 of the Constitution, and by Germany in accordance with article 
24 of the Basic Law, and was made part of national law in both 
states through an act of parliament, national courts are required to 
apply the supremacy rule irrespective of any subsequent national 
law. This is a logical result even though the two constitutional 
articles are not construed as according constitutional status to the 
Community treaty or any other treaty. In fact, under this theory 
Community law would have a status superior to that of a constitu-
tional law. 
It should be made clear that neither of the two views set forth 
here has received specific approval in national courts or general 
acceptance in the literature, even though they are supported by 
respectable authority. A strong argument can be made, however, 
that in the Costa judgment the Community Court in principle em-
braced the new approach and held that the rule prescribing su-
premacy of Community law, although originating in the Community 
treaty, binds national courts directly and must be applied by them 
regardless of any contrary national constitutional provisions con-
cerning treaty law in general.158 If this view is adopted, the court of 
Milan in the Costa case would be free to proceed with an inquiry 
into whether the nationalization law was consistent with the Com-
munity treaty as it was interpreted by the Community Court despite 
57. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U.N., [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 
174, 180 (advisory opinion), 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 589, 595 (1949). 
58. Frowein, supra note 4, at 236 suggests that this interpretation is one of the 
future. See Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, supra note 7, at 7-8. The 
Advocate General said: 
"Without wishing to have recourse to doctrinal concepts, which are far too 
controversial, on the nature of the European Communities, or to take sides be-
tween a 'federal Europe' and a 'Europe of fatherlands,' or between the 'supra-
national' and 'international' concepts, the judge (this is his function) can only 
consider the treaty as it is. The treaty establishing the EEG-this is simply a 
statement of fact-like the other two European treaties, creates its own legal 
order, separate from the legal order of each of the member states, which, how-
ever, replaces [the latter orders] in part according to exact rules laid down by 
the treaty itself, rules that consist in agreed transfers of jurisdiction to common 
institutions." Id. at 5. 
The specific argument in Italian law might be that the rule lex posterior 
derogat priori contained in art. 15 of the Preliminary Provisions of the Civil Code Wall 
modified by the Law of Oct. 14, 1957, No. 1203, approving the European Economic 
Community treaty to the extent a modification was necessary to assure the supremacy 
of the treaty and Community regulations over prior and subsequent Italian law. 
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the implication in the judgment of the Constitutional Court that 
such inquiry was irrelevant. Whether an Italian court would choose 
this course is obviously an open question. However, at least one 
Italian author has suggested that precisely because of the absolute 
supremacy of the Community law, the Constitutional Court did 
not have jurisdiction to deal with the issue of an alleged Com-
munity treaty-Italian law conflict and presumably the trial court 
would be free to proceed with the necessary inquiry.r;o 
CONCLUSIONS 
The judgment in the Costa case may be interpreted as holding 
that Community law (that is, the treaty and the regulations) is 
superior to national law, including national constitutions, not only 
in the Community legal order but also in the national legal orders 
and that the supremacy rule is directly and immediately applicable 
by national courts, any contrary national provisions regarding 
ordinary treaties notwithstanding. If this is the correct interpre-
tation, it is perhaps the first time in history that a court established 
by an international treaty has asserted its power to determine, with 
effect not only in the "international" (or Community) legal order 
but also in national law, the hierarchical value of the very norm to 
which it owes its existence. If one accepts the new doctrinal basis sug-
gested above, the Court could be said to have dealt with the Com-
munity treaty as if it were a constitution rather than a treaty and 
in effect to have rejected the public international law rationale for 
its power. One is reminded of the recent opinion of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the controversial Sabbatino case, 
wherein the Court rejected the international law or "comity'' ra-
tionale for the "act of state" doctrine and replaced it with a new 
rationale drawn from the "constitutional underpinnings" of the 
federation. 60 
Recognition on the part of the Community Court in the Van 
Gend and Costa cases that its power to decree the supremacy of 
59. Migliazza, La nazionalizzazione dell'energia elettrica e il diritto delle Com-
munita Europee, Foro pad. 1964, IV, at 18. The argument appears to be that, because 
of the special nature of the Community system, the pattern of adoption of Community 
law based upon a treaty falling within the scope of article 11 of the Constitution is 
not subject to the rules that govern ordinary treaties. In fact, a new, different system 
was created which is superior to any prior Italian constitutional law or any prior or 
subsequent ordinary law. Because of the supremacy of the Community system over the 
Italian legal system, no question of constitutionality can arise for the Constitutional 
Court, and the supremacy must be given effect by ordinary and "special" Italian 
courts. See also Stendardi, supra note 13, at 1181. 
60. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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Community law does not embrace the power specifically to declare 
a given national law invalid prevents that court from taking the 
step taken by the United States Supreme Court when it asserted 
its power to strike down a state law or prior federal law violating a 
treaty. In the context of the Community, this gap may not be of 
decisive importance if it is realized that the decision of the Com-
munity Court interpreting the relevant Community law as well as 
the supremacy'rule itself is binding directly upon the national judge. 
As a practical proposition, it will be necessary in any case in 
Italy, and possibly also in Germany and Belgium where the principle 
of supremacy of treaty law generally (or Community law especially) 
over subsequent legislation is not part of established constitutional 
practice as yet, to adjust such practice accordingly, either by a de-
cision of a national tribunal or by a legislative or constitutional act. 
The competent Italian Court may find it advisable, when the next 
opportunity arises, to bring about the necessary adjustment in Italy. 
It is unlikely, however, that the supremacy issue will arise very 
often in as sharp and inexorable a context as was presented by the 
Costa case. In the first place, a national court faced with an alleged 
conflict between Community law and subsequent national law 
would as a rule be able to go a considerable distance toward re-
moving the conflict by an appropriate construction of the national 
law; the court might even view the Community law as lex specialis, 
which the national law as lex generalis does not purport to affect.61 
Again, even if the doctrine of absolute supremacy is accepted with-
out qualification, it must be kept in mind that the areas over which 
the Community has sole jurisdiction to the exclusion of the national 
lawmaker are not many. Even in a field where the Community has 
exclusive jurisdiction it might be unwise at this juncture to insist 
that every national measure automatically is void for lack of juris-
diction, regardless of its substantive content, even when the compe-
tent Community institution has not acted as yet or where the act of 
the institution is not necessarily in conflict with the national mea-
sure. There is hardly room in the Community context for an an-
alogy with the federal pre-emption doctrine as it evolved in the 
United States. Moreover, a question may arise, particularly in the 
earlier stages of the Community when national policies still differ 
widely and common policy is not firmly set, whether each and every 
divergence between national and Community law should necessarily 
be viewed as constituting a conflict to which the Community su-
61. See Frowein, supra note 4, at 234; Perassi (Crosa ed.), supra note 41, at 242•44. 
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premacy rule must apply, especially when the national law is clearly 
in line with an important objective of the Community. If, for 
instance, the Community Commission in the exercise of its exclu-
sive power under article 85(3) of the treaty grants an exemption to 
a certain cartel and thus declares it legal, may a national authority 
nevertheless hold such cartel illegal as contrary to national law? 
The national action in question aims at increasing competition, 
which is a basic treaty objective; should it be subordinated to an-
other treaty objective, that is, improved rationalization of produc-
tion or distribution through certain types of cartels?62 In areas of 
concurrent or national jurisdiction, there will be perhaps room 
for the development of a doctrine of "Community fidelity" analo-
gous to the idea of "federal fidelity" evolved by the German Con-
stitutional Court to "sweeten" the relationship between the federa-
tion and the component Lander.63 
·with respect to Germany particularly, another factor should be 
considered. In that country, largely as a result of the post-Weimar 
experience, the conviction is strong that the system of checks and 
balances of public power in general, and the federal system assuring 
a decentralization of public. power in particular, must be preserved 
and must not be impaired by the Community. It is generally recog-
nized that a major aspect of the Community scheme is the transfer 
of substantial law-making powers previously held by national parlia-
ments to the Community institutions, particularly the Council of 
Ministers, which is composed of and dominated by national execu-
tives and is not answerable to any Community organ except, of 
course, in a limited way to the Community Court. If the Ministers 
are allowed to make law without an effective Community-level par-
liamentary control as is the case today, there may be some merit 
in the argument that as an ultimate safeguard national parliaments 
must retain the power to compel their courts to enforce national 
law even where it conflicts with Community law. The problem is 
more general and exceeds the confines of the supremacy issue. As 
long as the preponderance of power remains with member states the 
present pattern of Community institutions may be considered ade-
quate. But if, as is contemplated, Community law-making should 
substantially replace national law-making in the economic field, 
this pattern will require adjustment lest the basic concept of 
62. Steindorf, Das Wettbewerbsrecht der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften und das 
nationale Recht, in 1 KARTELLE UND MONOPOLE IM MoDERNEN REcHT 157, 178 (1961). 
63. Judgment No. 22, March 26, 1957, ("Reichskonkordat') 6 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 309 (1957). McWhinney, Federal Constitutional Law and 
the Deaty-Making Power, 35 CAN. B. REv. 842 (1957). 
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democratic government embodied in national constitutions of the 
member states be impaired. It has been suggested that despite a 
rather widely held feeling of a "crisis of parliamentarism" in Europe 
the remedy would be to increase the powers of the European Parlia-
ment, whose functions in the law-making process are in effect 
purely advisory under the present treaty.64 Such a step may prove 
advisable, if not indispensable, in the long run-even though it is 
not politically feasible today-not only to ensure political accept-
ance of Community law as an expression of the expectations of the 
people but also to protect the Community against the charge that 
it is incompatible with national constitutions. In fact, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court currently has before it the question of 
compatibility of the Community treaty with the German Basic Law;0is 
the Italian courts have thus far rejected the claims of unconstitution-
ality as "manifestly unfounded,"66 and the issue is not likely to arise 
in this context in other member states of the Community since na-
tional courts do not have the authority to review laws and treaties 
for constitutionality. But, in most countries of the Community, the 
political issue of parliamentary control is likely to prove more im-
portant than the legal issue. 
The Community Court must, of course, keep in mind at all times 
that it is not a federal court backed up by an integrated federal 
power, and it must be aware of the dangers inherent in pressing 
"legal integration" too far ahead of integration in the economic and 
political fields. There is, however, evidence that the court calculated 
the risk correctly when it declared the 'supremacy rule in the Costa 
case and that the ruling will receive the necessary political backing. 
When the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court was drawn 
to the attention of the Councils of Ministers by a member of the 
European Parliament, the Councils referred the questioner to the 
Community Court's judgment in the Costa case. Although the 
64. See, e.g., European Parliament, Working Documents 1963-1964, Report prepared 
on behalf of the Political Committee on the powers and competence of the European 
Parliament, Rap. Herr Hans Furler, Doc. 31, June 14, 1963, at 70. 
65. The Fiscal Court of the Land Rheinland Pfalz was the first court to question 
the constitutionality of the Community treaty in Germany. Judgment Nov. 14, 1963, 
Case No. RML, III 77 /63. The case is now pending before the Federal Constitutional 
Court. For a partial text of the lower court holding, see Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des 
Betriebs-Beraters 1964, 26, and for comment, see Ophiils, Deutsches Zustimmungsgesetz 
zum EWG-Vertrag teilweise verfassungswidrig'!, in id. at 65. For an opposite view 
rejecting the claim of unconstitutionality, see judgment of the Administrative Court 
of Frankfurt/Main, of Dec. 17, 1963, Case No. II/1, 636/63, id. 1964, at 60. See CCH 
COMMON MARKET REP. 1[ 9133 (1964). See also Conclusions of the Advocate General, 
supra note 7, at 8-10. 
66. See note 17 supra for the judgments of the courts of Naples and Rome. The 
cases dealt with the European Coal and Steel Community. 
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Councils understandably made it clear that they did not wish to take 
a position on the legal issues, they nevertheless expressed their aware-
ness of the "political importance of a faithful application of Com-
munity law in the member states for the establishment of the Com-
mon Market and more generally for the realization of the objectives 
of the European treaties. Consequently, [the Councils] pursue with 
the greatest attention the problems which arise in this respect."67 It 
is difficult to conceive that the "political" branch of the Community 
could have gone much farther in expressing its support for the 
Community judiciary than it did in this official reply. 
In the legal-constitutional sense, the Costa judgment is a mile-
stone. In the social context, a rule has been proclaimed that is de-
signed to strengthen the symbol of the Community and thus to con-
tribute, along with the economic, political, and social factors, toward 
the partial transfer of the loyalties of the people to the Com-
munity. Such a change in the fundamental attitudes of individuals 
67. Journal Officiel, supra note 6. The question was directed to the Council of 
Ministers of the European Economic Community and to the Council of Ministers of the 
European Atomic Energy Community. See also statement of Prof. Hallstein, President 
of the European Economic Community Commission, European Parliament, Debats 
parlementaries, Doc. No. 13A, June 18, 1964, at 535. President Hallstein said: 
"I would like to sum up the Commission's opinion on this point as follows: 
"First: the legal acts of the Community organs can be defined, examined as to 
their validity and interpreted only in terms of Community law. Assimilating 
them to categories of State legal systems involves the danger of misunderstandings 
and erroneous conclusions. Thus we are obviously led astray if regulations of the 
Community organs are designated as derived rules of law applied by delegation 
from the real lawmaker. 
"Secondly, the Community's legal order is, on the other hand, dovetailed into 
the law of the Member States in a great variety of ways. Official bodies, administra-
tive authorities and courts in the Member States are increasingly applying rules of 
Community law. This interplay of two legal systems is not without precedent. 
Federal associations of various types and degrees offer examples of it. Here the 
rule that each part can only lay down valid law in the sphere of competence 
allotted to it, or which it has retained-a rule which, as we know, also applies to 
our Community-avoids constant conflict between different legal systems. If, 
however, an overlap of competence should exceptionally exist and there should 
be a clash of valid rules apparently requiring equal respect, it necessarily follows 
from the character of the merger into a wider order that the law of the superior 
association takes precedence-but I repeat, only in its sphere of competence. 
"Thirdly, this precedence above all means two things: the rules of Community 
law come first irrespective of the level of the two orders at which the conflict occurs. 
And further, Community law not only invalidates previous national law but also 
debars subsequent national law. Both rules of conflict are part of that solidly en-
trenched body of law applied in comparable cases. Without them to acknowledge 
the supremacy of Community law would be no more than a courteous gesture, 
carrying no obligations. In reality the Member States could do with it what they 
liked. 
"Fourthly, and in support of the above, a unified solution valid for the whole 
Community must be provided for the order of precedence here mentioned. Any 
attempt to solve the order of precedence differently to accord with the idiosyn-
crasies of the Member States, their constitution and political structure, runs 
counter to the unifying character of European integration, and thus to the 
fundamental principles of our Community. The Commission thinks it particularly 
important to note this fact." English translation from 7 Bulletin of the EEC 
10-11 (Aug. 1964). 
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will be necessary if the Community is to become in reality something 
more than an instrumentality of national governments. 
In the literature, the problem of Community law supremacy has 
evoked significant methodological controversy. The question is, as 
demonstrated above, to what extent solutions of Community prob-
lems will be derived from concepts of international law, federal-
state law, or public law generally and, above all, to what extent these 
solutions will be hampered by unreasoned dogmatic positivism. 
The significance of the legal and political issues discussed in 
this article extends beyond the arena of the European Community. 
Central American integration, for instance, has now reached a stage 
of development-at least on the legal-institutional level-where the 
problem of the relationship between Central American integra-
tion law and national law of the member states is coming under 
scrutiny. A seminar group assembled by the Inter-American Insti-
tute of International Legal Studies has recommended that this prob-
lem be included in a systematic examination of legal issues posed 
by Central American integration. 68 
As current intergovernmental institutions prove inadequate to 
achieve the common interests of member states on regional or func-
tional levels, the interaction of treaty law with national law will 
demand increasing attention. 
68. Report of the General Secretariat, Inter-American Institute of International 
Legal Studies, Seminar on Legal and Institutional Aspects of Central American 
Integration at 8 (Engl. text) (Washington, D.C. 1964). For the texts of the Central 
American integration treaties, see INSI'RUMENTOS RELATIVOS A LA INTEGRACI6N Eco-
N6MICA EN AMERICA LATINA, INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE EsruDIOS JUIUDICOS INTER• 
NACIONALES (Washington, D.C. 1964). 
